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1 INTRODUCTION
Expert estimation or elicitation involves polling sub-
ject matter experts to produce a probability of hu-
man error or hardware failure. The analyst who or-
chestrates the expert elicitation incorporates expert
estimates into an overall risk model. Expert elicita-
tion has proven especially useful within safety-
critical industries to ensure compliance within regu-
lated operating parameters. When operational data
for hardware or performance data for human opera-
tors are not available, expert elicitation provides
quantitative measures suitable for inclusion in prob-
abilistic safety assessment (PSA) and human reli-
ability analysis (HRA) models. These models en-
sure optimal safety of systems by identifying and
minimizing risks.
An expert elicitation for the purpose of support-
ing risk assessment involves two components: (i) a
subject matter expert and (ii) a judgment about the
likelihood of event occurrence. It is common to fo-
cus primarily on one of these areas; however, it is
absolutely necessary to consider both. The success
of expert elicitation hinges on the well-orchestrated
interplay of the right subject matter expert using the
right information (or the information available) in
conjunction with the correct method to judge event
likelihoods. This paper reviews expertise and judg-
ment, offering new insights into how to use these
components to improve the quality of expert elicita-
tion in risk assessment.
2 CHARACTERISTICS OF EXPERTISE
Expertise involves experience and knowledge that
can be applied to a particular domain. Simon and
Chase (1973) suggest that for most domains it takes
a minimum of ten years of experience to achieve ex-
pertise. These ten years are not prescriptive for all
expertise or all individuals. New expertise may
transfer directly from existing expertise and profi-
ciency, effectively shortening the amount of time
and experience that is necessary to yield expertise.
It should also be noted that while having ten years or
equivalent of experience may be requisite for exper-
tise, ten years of experience by no means guarantees
expertise. A large component of experiential exper-
tise involves having had sufficient long-term expo-
sure as well as active engagement in the domain to
make logical inferences for novel situations within
that domain. In the case of risk analysis, it is easy to
see that a combination of experience in operations,
regulation, model development, and hands-on PSA
and HRA are desirable characteristics that contribute
to expertise.
Expert knowledge is more coherent and more
structured than novice knowledge (Wilson, 1994),
with the degree of knowledge coherence and struc-
ture increasing through experience. Knowledge is a
natural byproduct of experience. But, expert knowl-
edge is only achieved through ongoing activity in
the topic (Ericsson, Krampe, and Tesch-Römer,
1993). Expert knowledge requires ongoing practice
in the topic of mastery coupled with a deliberate ef-
fort to increase knowledge. Simple passive expo-
sure and experience without engagement, motiva-
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tion, and effort do not craft expertise nor deep
knowledge and understanding of the domain.
Anderson (1995; see also Rasmussen, 1985)
suggests that there are three stages in the acquisition
of skills and expertise. During the first stage—the
cognitive stage—an individual acquires knowledge
in the form of facts. During this phase, the individ-
ual has so-called “textbook learning” but has limited
application of the principles he or she has learned.
In the second stage of skill and expertise acquisi-
tion—the associative stage—the individual begins to
apply and use the knowledge. The individual is an
“apprentice” in synthesizing factual knowledge with
application. In the third and final stage—the
autonomous stage—the individual becomes an ex-
pert. Knowledge becomes proceduralized and
automatic rather than studied or deliberate. At this
stage, the expert individual is able to apply knowl-
edge quickly and effortlessly to his or her domain of
expertise.
Weiss and Shanteau (2003) argue that evalua-
tive skill is the defining characteristic of expertise.
Evaluative skill combines with a particular elicita-
tion domain to yield topical expertise. Weiss and
Shanteau present the following examples of topical
expertise:
1. evaluation + qualititative or quantititative ex-
pression = expert judgment
2. evaluation + projection = expert prediction
3. evaluation + communication = expert instruction
4. evaluation + execution = expert performance
Expert elicitation within risk analysis falls into
the first two categories. Expert judgment is made
regarding the circumstances of an off-normal event.
The analyst’s evaluation of the circumstances is
combined with quantification of the event likelihood
to yield estimated failure rates or human error prob-
abilities. In some cases the risk analyst must project
event likelihoods given minimal actual operating
data. Expertise resides in the analyst’s acumen at
translating domain knowledge of operations into a
judgment or prediction of event occurrence. Within
formal PSA, expert estimation is often accomplished
through the aggregation of estimations from multiple
experts or analysts. The present discussion consid-
ers expertise and judgment primarily from the per-
spective of a single expert.
3 JUDGMENT
For the purpose of the present discussion, judgments
and predictions about event likelihoods are treated as
identical processes and simply called judgments.
Judgments are the actual assignment of a rank, quan-
tity, certainty bounds, or probability to an event.
There are a number of general frameworks for gaug-
ing event likelihood and for translating that likeli-
hood into a number suitable for analysis. These
methods are elaborated below.
3.1 Atomistic and Holistic Judgment
3.1.1 Introduction
There are two common types of quantifiable judg-
ment processes—atomistic and holistic. Atomistic
judgments involve breaking a judgment area into
constituent subcomponents. Independent judgments
are made about each subcomponent, and later aggre-
gated into a summary judgment. In HRA, for exam-
ple, the atomistic model of judgment is the method
employed in estimating human error based on per-
formance shaping factors. For example, in the
SPAR-H method (Gertman et al., 2005), the human
error probability is the sum of the influence of eight
performance shaping factors on the default or nomi-
nal error rate.
In contrast, in holistic judgments, a judgment
about the overall event likelihood is made. Holistic
judgment eschews individual contributing factors
(like performance shaping factors) but, instead,
views the event and circumstances as irreducible. In
risk analysis, the holistic model of judgment is the
classic method of expert elicitation. In the holistic
scaling methods advocated in NUREG/CR-2743
(Seaver and Stillwell, 1983) and NUREG/CR-3688
(Comer, Seaver, Stillwell, and Gaddy, 1984), ana-
lysts make probability judgments about the likeli-
hood of the event, but the analysts do not explicitly
quantify the subfactors that contribute to the overall
error probability. In a sense, holistic proponents
have argued that the sum is not the product of the
parts but rather is the simultaneous interaction of all
parts related to safe operations. Holistically, this in-
teraction is considered irreducible.
3.1.2 Historical Basis of Atomism and Holism
It is important to consider the theoretical basis of the
distinction between atomism and holism. The notion
that there are two types of mental processes—one
holistic and another atomistic—has been the source
of considerable research and discussion in the psy-
chological literature, both prior to and concurrent
with their emergence in expert elicitation for event
likelihood in off-normal operating events. Underly-
ing this is the issue regarding humankind’s ability to
quantify—to associate probabilities with either ato-
mistic or holistic thought.
Early in the history of experimental psychology,
there was a school of psychology centered on the
idea of the deconstructability of mental processes.
Edward B. Titchener, chief proponent of the struc-
turalist movement in psychology, suggested that
consciousness should be investigated in terms of re-
duced component structures or processes, rather than
as a singular, irreducible process (Titchener, 1911).
Titchener advocated the deconstruction of all human
mental processes through use of systematic intro-
spection. Although introspection ultimately proved
a better resource for qualitative than quantitative
analysis of thought, the importance of structuralism
has endured into contemporary psychology.
It was the Gestalt psychologists, most notably
Max Wertheimer, Wolfgang Köhler, and Kurt Kof-
fka, who developed the strongest argument against
structuralist analysis of thought (Köhler, 1947).
Through a series of now famous perceptual illustra-
tions, the Gestalt psychologists demonstrated how
the mind operates according to grouping principles.
No matter how hard a person might try to separate
the components of visual objects that he or she sees,
these objects are unfailingly perceived in groups or
Gestalts. The key to the Gestalt argument is that this
grouping process occurs automatically, as a subcon-
scious process. In modern parlance, the process of
grouping is said to be cognitively impenetrable
(Pylyshyn, 1984), meaning the perceiver does not
have conscious access to the mental processes that
cause the perception of a single object. Moreover,
because the process is cognitively impenetrable, the
perceiver is not able to control the grouping proc-
esses that are at work. Normal human object per-
ception can never disconnect those components that
group together to create a single object.
At the heart of the structuralist/Gestaltist debate is
atomistic and holistic theory. Titchener and other
structuralists espoused an atomistic view of the
mind, which is to say that a mental process is the
sum of its constituent parts. Conversely, the Gestalt
psychologists argued for a holistic view of mind in
which a mental process is viewed as more than the
sum of its parts. At issue is also whether or not
thoughts are cognitively penetrable. An atomistic
model of the mind holds that mental processes are
comprised of discrete mental steps, which may be
accessed on a conscious level. A holistic model of
mind holds that mental processes are comprised of
automatic processes that are not consciously acces-
sible.
3.1.3 Atomistic and Holistic Risk Analysis
Atomistic and holistic expert elicitation methods
are loosely based on atomistic and holistic theories
of human cognition. In Gestaltist terms, the event
that is being judged by the analyst cannot be decom-
posed into and evaluated as constituent properties. A
holistic theorist would argue that an expert elicita-
tion represents an indivisible process and that an
event likelihood estimation cannot be judged merely
as the sum or product of the individual performance
shaping factors or degraded hardware reliability fac-
tors. To evaluate the probability of failure, the holis-
tic analyst should look at no smaller object than the
whole event itself.
In marked contrast, these elemental components
would be the only basis of evaluation by an atomis-
tic theorist. An atomistic theorist would attempt to
decompose the event into its most elemental units,
such as performance shaping factors. Each of these
components would be evaluated individually, and
the composite event likelihood would be the sum or
product of the values awarded for each factor. Ato-
mistic expert elicitation is, in fact, characterized by a
formal set of procedures for merging ratings from
individual contributing factors into a composite
event likelihood.
It is important to note that each method of expert
elicitation has documented shortcomings. Atomistic
elicitation, for example, is known to fail due to in-
sufficient information for completing the atomistic
rubric or due to clerical or procedural errors in com-
pleting the atomistic forms or worksheets
(Hammond, Hamm, Grassia, and Pearson, 1987).
Moreover, there is serious difficulty in designing a
valid and comprehensive atomistic rubric. A poorly
designed atomistic rubric will hamper efforts to ar-
rive at a meaningful representation and quantifica-
tion of the problem space. Designing a solid atomis-
tic scoring rubric is exacting and time consuming.
For example, the SPAR-H worksheets (Gertman et
al., 2005) represent ten years and three full iterations
in terms of development history. This development
time was necessary to produce a comprehensive list
of performance shaping factors, map the relationship
between these performance shaping factors and hu-
man error probabilities, and make adjustments based
on analyst feedback. Other atomistic approaches to
expert elicitation in the safety-critical arena feature
comparably long development histories.
Holistic elicitation features a similar array of
shortcomings. One primary concern is the level of
expertise required to perform holistic elicitation.
Because holistic elicitation allows the analyst to
evaluate according to their own criteria and impres-
sions, this method is not well suited for novice ana-
lysts. The use of novices in holistic elicitation re-
sults in very inconsistent ratings, as novices may use
ad hoc or inoperative judgment processes (Madigan
and Brosamer, 1991). A related concern with holis-
tic elicitation is that it commonly enlists selective in-
formation about the object of investigation. Etten-
son, Shanteau, and Krogstad (1987) show that expert
analysts tend to focus on selective information about
a problem space, to the detriment of other informa-
tion. For example, one risk analyst may focus on
how the failure event will fit within the plant model
construction (i.e., what configurations have been
modeled or what components may have been incor-
porated into a supercomponent, etc.), while another
analyst may give more weight to his or her impres-
sion of plant conditions as opposed to model repre-
sentations of those conditions. While this selectiv-
ity allows analysts to focus on the most crucial
information, it may also hinder the analyst from con-
sidering other contributing factors. The holistic
method does not explicitly require the analyst to
make a broad sweep of the problem space. This
means that the analyst, especially the novice analyst,
may omit important information when considering
the likelihood of an event. The open-ended evalua-
tion criteria of holistic elicitation are a significant
contributor to the holistic method’s generally low in-
ter-rater reliability as reported in Boring (2003a).
3.2 Judgment and Scaling
3.2.1 Error Estimation Process
Both atomistic and holistic approaches to expert
elicitation involve determination of a failure rates
through estimation. In atomistic approaches, a base-
line is incremented or decremented using hardware
degradation considerations or human performance
shaping factors. In holistic approaches, the failure
rate is estimated based on the overall event context.
Failure estimation entails comparison either to a
standard or to other tasks or errors that the analysts
review. There is a qualified body of research in the
psychological literature that deals with ensuring a
stable, repeatable process for comparison. This
process is known as psychological scaling.
Stillwell, Seaver, and Schwartz (1982) performed
research for the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
in which they compared five common methods of
psychological scaling. These are:
1. Scaling by paired comparison. In this method,
all possible pairs of events are presented to the
analyst. The analyst then judges for each event
pair which event is more likely to occur. This
method provides the frequency that a given event
is more likely to occur than another event.
2. Scaling by ranking. In this method, the analyst
assigns a rank order or event likelihood to each
event, resulting in a rank ordering all event like-
lihoods.
3. Scaling by sorting. This method, also known as
card sorting, entails sorting events into piles
based on their similarity. In terms of failure es-
timation, the piles can be sorted to represent dif-
ferent categories of event likelihood.
4. Scaling by rating. This method, also known as
categorical judgment or Thurstonian scaling, en-
tails assigning an event to a category label or
number that reflect the event likelihood. This
method has the advantage that an event may be
analyzed in isolation, without the need for a
comparative listing of events.
5. Scaling by fractionation. This method is also
known as magnitude estimation or direct estima-
tion. In this method, the analyst assigns a num-
ber or similar descriptor to the event to indicate
the event likelihood. Like scaling by rating, this
method allows the analyst to look at a single
event without the need for comparing other
events. This method features a further advantage
in that the resulting scale is a continuous scale
instead of a categorical scale. The categorical
scale produced by scaling by rating does not
guarantee equal quantitative intervals between
categories. The distinction between “medium”
and “high” is not quantifiable to the same degree
that the distinction between 3.5 and 4.7 is. Cate-
gorical scales are known as nominal or ordinal
scales, while continuous scales are known as in-
terval or ratio scales (Stevens, 1975).
Stillwell et al. (1982) suggest that scaling by frac-
tionation is the most powerful method available for
expert elicitation, although it is susceptible to scal-
ing biases. By bias is meant the fact that people do
not treat a scale in a consistent, linear fashion.
3.2.2 The Role of Bias
Poulton (1989) provides a comprehensive list of
biases in psychological scaling. These include:
1. Contraction biases. There is, for example, a se-
ries of contraction biases, in which people do not
use the full range of the scale available to them.
A common form of this occurs when people
scale most magnitudes too closely to a central
scale value.
2. Inappropriate units of measurement. Other bi-
ases occur when people use inappropriate units
of magnitude. Such would be the case, for ex-
ample, when judging temperature on a novel
scale despite high familiarity with the Fahrenheit
or Celsius scale. The familiar Fahrenheit or Cel-
sius scale could hamper the ability of a person to
scale using a different temperature scale, and the
person would have a proclivity for inadvertently
using the familiar scale.
3. Logarithmic response biases. When people do
not use a scale consistently across the scale
range, they often exhibit a logarithmic response
bias. This may happen when a person does not
know how to map a magnitude to a scale in a
particular range. Familiarity with one part of the
scale range breeds finer granularity for that part
of the scale. For example, if a person scales a
stimulus in one-step increments in a low range
and then uses ten-step increments in a high
range, this would result in a logarithmic shaped
curve.
4. Range equalizing biases. In some cases, people
scale using the entire range of a scale, even when
the stimulus does not warrant a full range of re-
sponses. In such cases, people exhibit range
equalizing biases. If, for example, a subset of
stimuli is presented at around the midpoint of a
scale yet the person provides responses spanning
the full range, then that person is equalizing the
range of his or her scale response.
5. Centering biases. When people use all scale re-
sponses above and below the midpoint of a scale
equally often, there are centering biases. For ex-
ample, when a person is presented with a range
of loud stimuli, that person might assign loud-
ness values localized around the midpoint of the
scale. When presented with a range of quiet
stimuli, the person might assign roughly the
same range of responses. Although the stimuli
are clearly different, the response bias of the in-
dividual tends to center the scale responses,
thereby minimizing the scale differences be-
tween the two stimuli. Helson’s adaptation-level
theory (1964) accounts for this phenomenon, in
which people adapt their perceptual response ac-
cording to the intensity of the stimuli with which
they are presented.
Although Poulton’s scaling biases are most
clearly illustrated through perceptual scaling exam-
ples, scaling biases are endemic to expert elicitation
as well. These biases most commonly manifest
themselves in the form of a failure to use the full
range of the probabilistic scale (i.e., a contraction
bias) or a tendency inappropriately to use the ex-
treme probabilities (i.e., a range equalizing bias).
Thus, it is imperative to provide training and or in-
struction to experts in order to help limit bias influ-
ences.
Without guidance, analysts may fail to assign the
full range of applicable probabilities and instead
tend to focus on extremes, i.e., assigning events as
having an unrealistically low or high probability of
occurrence. Alternately, analysts may assign neu-
tral, midrange probabilities to events that would
more accurately reflect a lower or higher probability.
With these many biases coming into play, ana-
lysts need to exercise caution before treating their
scaling measures with the kind of confidence that a
physical scientist might exercise. Too often, ana-
lysts correct for biased scaling results without reme-
dying the cause of the biases. Mathematical correc-
tions are applied to the estimations and groups of
analysts are enlisted for a study to compensate for
scaling biases (Meyer and Booker, 1990). While
there is definite value in post hoc scaling correc-
tions, there is also a need to prevent scaling biases.
3.2.3 The Role of Training
The key to preventing scaling biases is training.
Two noteworthy approaches exist for training on
scaling. The first approach is constrained scaling
(West, Ward, and Khosla, 2000). Constrained scal-
ing attempts to calibrate the individual to the range
of a scale. Typically, analysts are trained to match a
physical stimulus (such as loudness) to a numeric
scale (such as a 1-100 scale). Through multiple it-
erations across the full stimulus range, the individual
receives feedback about the magnitude of the stimu-
lus. The individual learns the use of the scale and is
able to apply that scale to other domains. The result
is significantly decreased variability in scaling re-
sults. Recent research (Boring, 2003b; West, Bor-
ing, and Moore, 2002) has shown that training on a
physical stimulus such as loudness or brightness
generalizes well to other dimensions and that con-
strained scaling can serve as a general-purpose
method for increasing psychological scaling reliabil-
ity. Nonetheless, the feasibility of using this method
of scale calibration for expert elicitation has not yet
been determined and warrants further investigation.
A second approach to preventing scaling biases is
to provide training in probabilistic reasoning, spe-
cifically Bayesian reasoning (Sedlmeier and Giger-
enzer, 2001). Extensive training is available on PSA,
HRA, and specific expert elicitation methods. How-
ever, the importance of basic instruction in Bayesian
reasoning and probabilistic techniques is commonly
overlooked.
The key assumption here is that most individuals
have some degree of probabilistic innumeracy and
have not achieved expertise in assigning probabili-
ties to events. Individuals tend to overweigh statisti-
cal base rates and neglect relevant information that
would affect the event probability. Through training
on Bayesian reasoning and the use of frequency in-
formation instead of raw probability scores, the
authors argue, individuals are able to use the scale
range available more accurately to reflect likelihood
judgments.
These two examples—constrained scaling and
Bayesian reasoning—illustrate the importance of
giving the analyst explicit training on probabilistic
scale use. Expert knowledge is benefited when it is
coupled with honed elicitation. Training to calibrate
likelihood estimation across analysts is an important
step toward mitigating the effects of scaling biases
on error and failure probabilities.
3.3 Univariate and Multivariate Judgments
An important concept in measurement in the physi-
cal sciences centers on the multidimensionality of
measurement for any given object. As Kyburg
(1984, p. 17) notes:
Measurement is often characterized as the assignment of
numbers to objects (or processes). Thus we may assign
one number to a steel rod to reflect its length, another to
indicate its mass, yet another to correspond to its elec-
trical resistance, and so on. It is thus natural to view a
quantity as a function whose domain is the set of things
that quantity may characterize, and whose range is in-
cluded in the set of real numbers.
Any object or event has a multitude of magnitude
dimensions in which it may be measured. While in
many cases these magnitude dimensions may be or-
thogonal, they are often interrelated.
The psychological analog to measurement in the
physical sciences is scaling, including expert elicita-
tion methods. Psychological scaling has univariate
and multivariate components. If a single factor con-
tributes to an event, then the judgment of that event
is univariate. If a combination of factors contributes
to an event, then the judgment of that event is multi-
variate.
Most reportable events in the safety-critical in-
dustries will feature a combination of contributing
factors. This is, in part, due to deliberate safeguards
and redundancies in operational processes, which
minimize the chance that a single failure will esca-
late to become an off-normal event. For example, a
maintenance electrician may accidentally reverse the
polarity of a switch during installation. This error
may be due to the electrician’s fatigue at the end of
the work shift. However, due to prescribed post
maintenance checking, the electrician catches the er-
ror before it affects plant operations. If another con-
tributing factor is added to the situation, the likeli-
hood of the error leading to a reportable event
increases. For example, if the procedures for install-
ing the switch fail to specify post maintenance test-
ing, the error may compound to affect operations
adversely. The likelihood of error further increases
as additional contributing factors are added. Fatigue
and poor procedures might be joined by poor light-
ing at the switchboard where the switch is being in-
stalled. This poor lighting might make it difficult
for the electrician to see the color of the wires being
installed. Thus, ergonomics would escalate the
probability of the error and the failure to correct it
before it is put into service.
Table 1 depicts the considerations for using ato-
mistic or holistic analysis for univariate and multi-
variate problems. In an atomistic approach to hu-
man reliability analysis, the analyst would classify
each of the contributing factors to the event. The
above example suggests that fitness for duty was
low, that the switchboard featured poor maintenance
ergonomics, and that there were issues with the pro-
cedures used for electrical maintenance. Perform-
ance shaping factors corresponding to these contrib-
uting factors would be flagged, and the human error
probability would be computed accordingly. The
performance shaping factor rubric or checklist forces
the analyst to consider a variety of factors and there-
fore minimizes the chance of excluding important
contributing factors. But, if the list of performance
shaping factors in incomplete or fails to match the
actual circumstances of the event, the analyst may
overlook an important contributor or may need to
use a supplemental holistic approach to model the
complete circumstances of the event.
Table 1. Considerations for using atomistic or holistic judg-
ment strategies for univariate and multivariate problem spaces
for an event.
Judgment Strategy
Atomistic Holistic
U
n
iv
a
r
ia
te
Works well if one of
the items on rubric/check-
list matches the cause of
the event.
Useful especially in
unusual, previously unen-
countered situations.
Works well if analyst
avoids extraneous factors.
P
r
o
b
le
m
S
p
a
c
e
M
u
lt
iv
a
r
ia
te
Rubric/checklist helps ana-
lyst focus on relevant con-
tributors to multivariate
events.
Prone to inclusion of
extraneous factors or scal-
ing biases for multivariate
events.
In a holistic approach, the analyst synthesizes
contributors to an event to determine the appropriate
error probability. The open-ended nature of the ho-
listic approach affords the analyst considerable
flexibility in considering unusual contributing fac-
tors that may not be included in an atomistic check-
list. Because the holistic approach does not neces-
sarily provide guidance to zero in on common
contributing factors, the holistic analyst is more
likely than the atomistic analyst to consider factors
extraneous to the event outcome.
Further, the holistic approach typically fails to
provide clear guidelines for aggregating multivariate
contributors to an event. Without a formal proce-
dure, the aggregation of multivariate contributors
may exhibit large inconsistencies within an individ-
ual analyst and across multiple analysts.
4 CONCLUSIONS
When dealing with the type of expert elicitation in-
volved in PSA and HRA, expertise is not something
that is readily manipulated. It is assumed that risk
analysts possess a high degree of subject-matter ex-
pertise based on regulatory and operations experi-
ence as well as extensive formal training. However,
it should be assumed that a subject-matter expert,
without formal training in expert elicitation methods,
is not necessarily an expert at making judgments
about event likelihoods. By definition, the events
for which expert judgment is required occur so in-
frequently that the experts will not have extensive
experience with them. Thus, the expert is called
upon to generalize from other events for which there
is sufficient theoretical and operating experience.
These other events may or may not readily general-
ize, and different experts may use different types of
events from their own experience to infer likeli-
hoods. Moreover, expert elicitation methods offer
considerably different methods for estimating event
probabilities, and some methods, such as holistic ap-
proaches, offer little guidance on scaling event mag-
nitudes and calculating event probabilities.
The manner in which experts make judgments
can have a significant bearing on the quality of those
judgments. It is the goal of this paper that future use
of expert estimation as well as future method devel-
opment in expert estimation will carefully consider
scaling biases, the importance of training for expert
estimation, and the differences between atomistic
and holistic judgments and their consequences for
univariate and multivariate problems. Without un-
derstanding the theoretic underpinnings of expertise
and judgment processes—and accounting for them
in practice and method development—expert elicita-
tion risks not being an effective tool for PSA and
HRA. The quality of estimation is potentially en-
hanced by consideration of these theoretical under-
pinnings and an active endeavor to improve expert
elicitation processes for risk analysis through further
exploration of these underpinnings.
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